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Abstract
It is evident everywhere that in manufacturing industry, levels of productivity 
are higher in large enterprises (LEs), including foreign-owned ﬁrms or multina-
tional companies (MNCs), than in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), partly 
because the former enterprises enjoy higher levels of technological capacity. 
Thus, for SMES, increased productivity might be facilitated through a scaling-up 
of knowledge or technology. The case study of the Tegal metalworking industry 
in Central Java presented in this article shows that the most important channels 
for the diffusion of knowledge/technology among domestic manufacturing 
SMEs include subcontracting arrangements with foreign direct investment 
(FDI). However, the importance of FDI as a source of technology/knowledge 
varies across the differing types of domestic ﬁrms. This study also shows that 
government agencies are currently the largest providers of training and similar 
assistance for manufacturing SMEs in the country. Such programmes, how-
ever, are rendered less effective by a low level of coverage, a lack of effective 
evaluation and assessment, and a supply rather than a demand orientation. 
Introduction
A key to increased productivity among manufacturing small and me-
dium enterprises (SMEs) is to build their capacities through improved 
knowledge or technological know-how. This technology development 
can take place internally (inside the ﬁrm) or can be fostered through 
access to outside sources, such as the transfer of technology from 
multinational companies (MNCs), technical licensing agreements and 
imported capital goods.
The main goal of this study is to address the following three research 
questions. First, what are the main channels used for transferring tech-
nology from abroad (mostly from developed countries) to Indonesia? 
Second, do foreign ﬁrms or MNCs play the dominant role in technology 
transfer to manufacturing SMEs in the country? Third, how effective 
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are government programmes in supporting the improvement of tech-
nological capacity in manufacturing SMEs? 
The structure of this study is as follows. After this introductory ﬁrst 
section, Section II compares the productivity of large enterprises (LEs), 
including foreign-owned enterprises and their technological capacities, 
with those of SMEs in the manufacturing industry. Section III explores 
the channels of technology transfer and diffusion. Section IV looks at the 
effectiveness of government-funded programmes to boost the techno-
logical ability of manufacturing SMEs. Section V presents the ﬁndings of 
a case study on knowledge diffusion in the Tegal metalworking industry 
in Central Java. Section VI offers some concluding remarks.
Productivity in Manufacturing SMEs in Indonesia: An 
Indicator of Technology Capacity
A number of researchers have attempted to measure the current 
technological capacity of Indonesian ﬁrms by comparing their levels 
of labour productivity with that of foreign ﬁrms. Recently, Takii and 
Ramstetter (2005) compared the average levels of labour productivity, 
as determined by value added/labour ratio, of foreign-owned and do-
mestic medium and large enterprises within the manufacturing sector 
in Indonesia.1 They found that the productivity differentials were often 
very large in the Indonesian manufacturing sector and varied not only 
over time but also across industries. If all manufacturing industries are 
analysed together, Takii and Ramstetter's study shows that compared 
to enterprises that are fully locally owned, the average level of labour 
productivity was 388 to 745 percent higher in minority foreign-owned 
ﬁrms; 436 to 594 percent higher in majority foreign-owned ﬁrms; and 
164 to 542 percent higher in ﬁrms with foreign shares of 90 percent or 
more. Higher levels of labour productivity in local ﬁrms than in foreign 
ﬁrms were extremely rare.
These ﬁndings support the general assumption that in a developing 
country such as Indonesia, foreign ﬁrms are more productive than local 
ﬁrms because they have relatively large endowments of ﬁrm-speciﬁc, 
generally intangible assets. One of the greatest of these intangible assets 
is assumed to be technological capacity. That minority foreign-owned 
enterprises appear to be less productive than majority or heavily foreign 
ﬁrms supports the assumption that these enterprises restrict the access 
of minority-foreign afﬁliates to these ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets in order to 
avoid losing control of them.
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Previously Sjöholm (1999a, 1999b) compared levels of labour pro-
ductivity of MNCs and domestic ﬁrms in Indonesia and came up with 
results similar to those of Takii and Ramstetter, supporting the thesis 
that because of their high level of technological and human resources, 
the level of labour productivity of the MNCs was correspondingly much 
higher than in the Indonesian ﬁrms. Unfortunately, Sjöholm's and Takii 
and Ramstetter's works are not so useful to us in this study because in 
their comparisons of labour productivity, they only distinguish between 
MNC plants and domestic plants in the various manufacturing indus-
tries, without differentiating between LEs and SMEs.2
Ofﬁcial data from the National Agency for Statistics (BPS) in manu-
facturing industry supports the theory that the value added/labour 
ratio increases by size of enterprise. This may suggest that in larger 
enterprises, the level of technology is higher than that in small ones (see 
Table 1). BPS splits the size of enterprises into three categories: micro 
enterprises (MIEs) with one to four workers, small enterprises (SEs) 
with ﬁve to 19 workers, medium enterprises (MEs) with 20 to 99 work-
ers, and large enterprises (LEs) with 100 or more workers. In MIEs and 
SEs, the labour productivity is much lower than that in MEs and LEs. 
This ﬁnding is not unexpected, since most MIEs and SEs in Indonesia 
(as in developing countries in general) are traditional enterprises using 
manual production techniques with a low degree of mechanization. By 
contrast, LEs (and to a lesser extent MEs) are usually mechanized and 
computerized, the production processes are much better managed and 
organized, and they employ more highly skilled workers. In the food and 
beverages industry, for instance, MIEs and SEs are very simple manu-
facturing units producing mostly for local markets, in contrast to LEs 
which are modern production units such as Unilever and Indofood.
Surprisingly, both the 2006 Rural Investment Climate Survey (World 
Bank 2006) and the Survey on Small Scale and Handicraft Industry in 
Indonesia from BPS show that the surveyed MIEs and SEs do not regard 
lack of technological capacity as one of their key constraints. And this 
TABLE 1: Value Added/Labour Ratio (Q1; 000 Rp) and Manufacturing 
Total Output Contribution (Q2; %) by Size of  Enterprise in Indonesia, 1999-
2003
Size group
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2
MEs & LEs combined 115.28 90.52 143.99 91.65 167.70 91.50 166.31 89.94 196. 90.68
MIEs & SEs combined 8.35 9.48 9.11 8.35 10.98 8.50 12.36 10.06 13.55 9.32
Source: BPS
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despite the fact that other evidence suggests that in some industries, 
MIEs are able to improve their technology capabilities and that this ben-
eﬁts their performance. For instance, from their studies on SME clusters 
in Central Java, Sandee (1994, 1995, 1996) and Sandee et al. (1994, 2000, 
2002) show that these smallest and most traditional enterprises are in 
a position to adopt innovations in products and production process, 
even without support from the government. For them, technological 
capability is a major determinant of business performance. This evidence 
suggests that there are substantial beneﬁts to be derived from improving 
technological capabilities.
Channels of Technology Transfer and Diffusion
The International Transfer of Technology/Knowledge
There are various channels through which technology may be trans-
ferred internationally. These include: foreign direct investment (FDI); 
technical licensing agreements between foreign and local ﬁrms; imports 
of intermediate and capital goods; education and training in technologi-
cally advanced countries; turnkey plants and project contracts; techni-
cal consultancies by foreign companies/consultancy ﬁrms; and simply 
through participation in world trade (export). This study focuses on 
three of these, which are considered as the most important channels of 
foreign technology transfers to Indonesian ﬁrms, including SMEs: (i) 
FDI, (ii) imports of intermediate and capital goods, and (iii) participa-
tion in world trade (Thee 2005).
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Because of the resources it brings and the attributes embedded in it, 
FDI can bolster technology capabilities in local industries through the 
transfer of technology and spillover effects. For example, Thee and 
Pangestu (1994) assess the technological capability of Indonesian textile, 
garment and electronics industries to show that in an effort to increase 
technological capability, Indonesian textile and garment manufacturers 
established strategic alliances with their Japanese counterparts to open 
up a vital channel of technology transfer. Similarly, business linkages 
with foreign ﬁrms have been a very important technology transfer 
channel for electronics ﬁrms, especially for consumer electronics and 
electronic components.
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However, the evidence suggests that the nature and extent of technol-
ogy that is transferred can be rather limited. For instance, according to 
their study, technology transfer in the textile industry was limited to 
improvements in production capability. Whilst important, more sophis-
ticated activities that might help local ﬁrms upgrade their technologi-
cal capabilities, including activities related to pre-investment, project 
implementation and technical changes in production or product were 
conducted by Japanese counterparts. 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006 from the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) also provides evidence to suggest that FDI can be a limited 
channel of technology transfer from foreign countries to Indonesian 
ﬁrms. Based on a survey of 150 enterprises from all sizes in all sectors 
(except agriculture) in Indonesia, this report shows that Indonesia ranks 
82nd of a total of 103 countries covered in the survey (WEF 2005).
In general, empirical studies on FDI as a channel for technology 
transfer in Indonesia fail to provide strong evidence to support the 
general view that there is a signiﬁcant degree of technology transfer and 
spillover effect from MNCs to Indonesian ﬁrms.3 Moreover, whether 
technology transfer will have a positive effect on the recipient ﬁrms or 
countries depends largely on the absorptive capacity of the ﬁrms/host 
countries; that is, on their ability to understand, assimilate and make 
effective use of the transferred knowledge or technology.
Imports of Intermediate and Capital Goods 
Intermediate and capital goods embody the technological know-how 
involved in their production. As a result, trade in these goods in itself 
promotes the transfer of technology between trading partners. This 
appears to have been an important channel for technology transfer 
to Indonesia, as the country has become more heavily dependent on 
imports of intermediate and capital goods.
The only study available that directly addresses the role of such 
imports in Indonesia is from Jacob and Meister (2005). They show that 
such imports have indeed made a signiﬁcant contribution to the per-
formance of Indonesian manufacturing, especially after liberalization 
and reforms conducted between 1988 and 1996. Their study is based 
on an assessment of the contribution of foreign technologies to manu-
facturing performance in Indonesia at the subsectoral level, in which 
they combined Indonesian data sets on production and input/output 
transactions with the R&D, export-to-Indonesia and output data of ten 
major OECD countries that trade with Indonesia.
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Other studies provide indirect evidence of the importance of imports 
of capital and intermediate goods. For example, Thee (2003) stresses the 
role of imports, particularly given the fact that capital goods industries 
in Indonesia are still underdeveloped. Similarly, BPS data show an 
increasing share of imported intermediate inputs and capital goods in 
Indonesia's total imports, suggesting that imports of these goods have 
been playing an important role in transferring technology from abroad 
to Indonesian ﬁrms.
Participation in World Trade
Participation in world trade through export has been used effectively by 
local ﬁrms as an important informal channel for the transfer of technolo-
gies. For example, local electronics ﬁrms in the East Asian countries such 
as South Korea and Taiwan were able to build up production capabili-
ties through the simple assembly of mature products for exports, often 
developed through technical assistance provided by foreign buyers.4 
This process of coupling exports with technology development is called 
'export-led technology development' (Hobday 1994: 335).
Similarly, since the mid-1970s, export has been an important informal 
channel for the transfer of technology from abroad to Indonesian ﬁrms, 
including SMEs. For example, the remarkable export performance of 
the garment industry in Bali and that of the furniture industry in Jepara 
(Central Java) since the mid-1970s share important characteristics with 
the experience of these East Asian ﬁrms. The case of Bali's garment 
industry in paticular shows the importance of foreign buyers (i.e. for-
eign ﬁrms, businessmen and tourists) as a vital source of innovation in 
their role as marketing intermediaries, connecting local producers with 
retail outlets abroad. In the process, these intermediaries dispensed 
important information on design and production techniques. Foreign 
buyers provided information and technical and managerial assistance 
on plant layout, the purchase of the most appropriate machines, and 
quality control methods, and also often acted as technical consultants 
to SMEs. As a result, these ﬁrms were able to achieve higher levels of 
efﬁciency and accuracy (Cole 1998). 
Foreign buyers also provided vital information as well as technical, 
managerial and marketing assistance during the development of the 
export-oriented furniture industry in Jepara, Central Java.  As a result, 
the quality of Jepara furniture has been steadily upgraded (Sandee et 
al. 2000: 5-7). Foreign buyers have also played a crucial role in provid-
ing guidance to SMEs on the furniture designs popular in the export 
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markets and the quality standards required to penetrate these markets 
(Berry and Levy, 1994; Schiller and Martin-Schiller 1997). 
These two cases show that SMEs in the two regions have beneﬁted 
from the inﬂow of technologies through their participation in foreign 
trade, suggesting that the more open the regional economy, the greater 
their chances of upgrading skills and technologies through this means. 
However, an important conclusion from these studies is that local SMEs 
must have some basic industrial competence in their particular ﬁeld of 
activity to be able to absorb the inﬂows of technology or knowledge. 
In this regard, Bali and Jepara are still exceptional cases. In general, the 
capability of Indonesian manufacturing SMEs, especially MIEs and SEs 
in rural areas, to adopt and deploy new technologies is limited due to 
the lack of management capacity, access to information, skilled work-
ers and capital. 
Domestic Diffusion of Technology/Knowledge
Although the international transfer of technologies is essential, such 
transfers tend primarily to impact larger and predominantly urban-
based enterprises in the country. For such technological knowledge to 
improve the productivity of rural manufacturing SMEs throughout the 
country, effective mechanisms are needed for the domestic diffusion of 
technical knowledge from the ﬁrst local recipient ﬁrms to other local 
ﬁrms, or from a local university as the ﬁrst recipient to local ﬁrms.5
Domestic diffusion of the transferred or imported technology or 
knowledge can occur in various ways6 and the most immediate and 
direct channel is through subcontracting, where buyers assist SME 
suppliers to meet technical standards for inputs. In addition, there is 
a growing recognition of the importance of long-term networks as a 
means of achieving the diffusion of technology/knowledge. Through 
networks an entrepreneur can obtain knowledge from other entrepre-
neurs in the same sector or from universities, R&D institutions or NGOs. 
The literature on networks in turn explores two main issues: strategic 
alliances and clusters.
Subcontracting
During the Soeharto era (1966-98), the government imposed a system 
of protection and local content rules in a number of industries, includ-
ing machinery, electronics and the automotive industry, as part of its 
import substitution policy. In these local content rules all assembling 
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industries should use some components produced locally. These rules 
stand as a clear lesson in how government interference does not facili-
tate the use of subcontracting as a means for achieving the domestic 
diffusion of technology or knowledge. The main aim of this policy was 
to encourage industrialization in the country and also to encourage a 
pattern of industrial development that followed the industrial pyramid 
model from Japanese. In this model, MIEs are at the base to support 
SEs, which then support MEs and the latter support LEs at the top of 
the pyramid (TAF 2000).
However, industrial development in Indonesia did not follow the 
same pattern as in Japan. On the contrary, the local content policy re-
sulted in a vertically integrated production system within LEs. The Asia 
Foundation (TAF 2000) argues that the lack of success of this policy in 
creating strong interdependence between SMEs and LEs was largely 
due to the government's excessive interference, aimed at replacing 
market mechanisms. 
The economic rationale behind this local content policy was to create a 
captive market for domestic products in order to increase the economic 
scale of production and thereby to increase efﬁciency. However, govern-
ment interference went too far. The government decided which products 
were to get priority in this policy, and introduced ﬁscal incentives in 
line with the type of priority recipient products. The determination of 
priorities did not appear to have been based on economic considerations, 
such as SMEs' capacity for investment and absorption of technology.
Similarly, Thee (1990b, 1997) argues that such production linkages 
did not develop smoothly during the New Order era because of market 
distortions and the lack of skills and low technological capabilities of 
local ﬁrms, especially SMEs. SRI International (1992) found that pro-
duction linkages between LEs and SME clusters were weak and only a 
small number of clusters (all located in Java) established subcontracting 
relationships with LEs. The general impression from other studies is also 
that subcontracting between LEs and SMEs is weak, mainly because the 
latter cannot meet the required quality standards, due to their lack of 
technology and skills.7
Although during the New Order era the local content rules as men-
tioned above were largely unsuccessful in developing viable domestic 
supplier ﬁrms, successful private-led subcontracting networks did 
arise in some industries and these did facilitate technological capacity 
building. One example is the case of Astra Otoparts, part of the Astra 
International business group, Indonesia's largest integrated automo-
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tive company. Through Astra Otoparts, Astra International was able 
to develop several SMEs into efﬁcient and viable suppliers. As a result 
of the rigorous training which Astra provided to local suppliers with 
potential, over time these suppliers were able to produce a wide range 
of parts and components for cars and motorcycles according to the 
high quality standards set by Astra, and also to meet its strict delivery 
schedules. 
Strategic Alliances 
Strategic alliances are deﬁned as the development of a long-term and 
stable relationship with other enterprises.8 Many researchers such as 
Perry and Pyatt (1995) and Weaver and Dickson (1995) maintain that such 
alliances form a key component of successful ﬁrms' competitiveness. Such 
partnerships are especially important for SMEs, which in general have 
limited capital, human resources, information and technology. Through 
collaborations, LEs can share their capacities with SMEs in order to reduce 
costs, without having to reduce the creativeness and competitiveness of 
each company involved (Weaver and Dickson 1995).
Strategic alliances are quite common among MEs. Tambunan (2006: 
237) surveyed 124 respondents, most of which were MEs, and found that 
more than 50 percent of them had strategic alliances with other ﬁrms. 
However, the percentage of those with strategic alliances differs among 
various industries. A majority of the ﬁrms surveyed in food, beverages 
and tobacco industries and industries manufacturing metal products, 
machines, tools and other capital goods had some kind of strategic al-
liances with other ﬁrms, while the proportion in other industries was 
considerably lower.
Most of the ﬁrms surveyed have had more than one type of strategic 
alliance (see Table 2). The most important types are long-term market-
ing output agreements, purchase–supplier alliances (i.e. cooperation 
between input suppliers and their purchasers), joint ventures with other 
enterprises, and cooperation in technology. With respect to the kinds 
of assistance that the surveyed ﬁrms have received from their strategic 
alliance partners, technology, market information and skills training are 
the most important. Cooperation in marketing, rather than in technol-
ogy, is also the most prevalent form of partnership in a study of 300 
enterprises in the food, timber products and clothing industries in six 
provinces in Indonesia (TAF 2000).
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Table 2:  
Types of Strategic Alliances by Surveyed Firms in Indonesia, 1997  
Types Percentage Use
Long-term marketing agreements 25.3 %
Purchaser–supplier alliance 23.9 %
Joint ventures with other SMEs 22.8 %
Technology alliances 22.0 %
Outside contracting 21.2 %
Licensing 20.0 %
Joint ventures with LEs 18.9 %
Equity investments 14.8 %
Export management 13.4 %
Source: Tambunan (2006) (ﬁeld survey 1997)
Clusters 
Clusters can be deﬁned as geographical concentrations of industries 
that gain performance advantages through co-location (Doeringer and 
Terkla 1995) and they can be a powerful means for SMEs to overcome 
constraints on their development. Through cooperation in a cluster, 
SMEs may take advantage of external economies such as the presence 
of suppliers of raw materials, components, or new technologies em-
bodied in new machinery and parts; the presence of workers with sec-
tor-speciﬁc skills; and the presence of workshops that make or service 
the machinery and production tools (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1995). 
Moreover, with the clustering of enterprises, it becomes easier for the 
government, LEs, universities/research institutes and other agencies 
to provide supporting services. These might include technical devel-
opment and management training as well as general facilities such as 
large machinery for raw material processing. Such services and facilities 
would be very costly to provide if provided to individual enterprises 
in dispersed locations (Tambunan 2000).
While clustering is commonplace throughout the developing world, 
well-developed networks among enterprises inside clusters and between 
the clusters and external agencies are rare. Highly developed inter-ﬁrm 
divisions of labour, subcontracting and cases where technical informa-
tion ﬂows have resulted in ongoing technical innovation tend only to 
be observed in the more advanced clusters of South East Asia and Latin 
America (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994). However, internal networks among 
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ﬁrms within clusters, as well as external networks, are important for 
the development of technology inside the clusters.9
Unfortunately, Indonesia's clusters appear to be quite weak in this 
regard. For example, Sato (2000) saw little evidence of positive effects of 
clustering, as she found no inter-ﬁrm specialization of work processes 
and no joint actions in marketing, production, distribution or techno-
logical development among the ﬁrms studied. Supratikno (2001, 2002) 
also found that, in general, very limited inter-ﬁrm specialization and 
cooperation among producers inside the clusters. He concluded that the 
importance of a cluster for production development, including technol-
ogy and marketing, depends on whether there are leading/pioneering 
ﬁrms inside the cluster. These are usually larger and faster growing ﬁrms 
that are able to manage a large and differentiated set of relationships 
with ﬁrms and institutions both within and outside clusters. Further-
more such ﬁrms have generally utilized cutting-edge technologies in 
production. He cited as examples the clove cigarette cluster in Kudus, 
the tea-processing cluster in Slawi, and tourism clusters in Bali. In the 
case of the clove cigarette cluster in Kudus, their products are able to 
outperform products from Philip Morris and BAT. Similarly, the tea-
processing cluster in Slawi, led by the large company Sostro, has grown 
to become the market leader in the Indonesian soft drink market, leaving 
giant Coca-Cola behind.
By contrast, Sandee et al. (2002) emphasize the role of traders, sup-
pliers of raw materials and other inputs, and other market agents in 
introducing new technologies into clusters. Weijland's studies (1992) 
emphasize the importance of middlemen or traders as a source of 
knowledge transfer to the clusters.  
The Effectiveness of Government and Government 
Funded Programs to Build Technological Capacity of 
Manufacturing SMEs
In Indonesia, almost all known types of government intervention to 
promote the development of SMEs have been tried at one time or an-
other. These include subsidized credit, such as credit for small farmers 
and village cooperatives (KUD), small-scale credit (KIK, KMKP, KUK), 
and credit for village units (KUPEDES); the development of small rural 
development banks (BKD); human resources development training such 
as production techniques, general management (MS/MUK), manage-
ment quality systems ISO-9000, and entrepreneurship (CEFE, AMT); 
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providing total quality control advice, technology and especially internet 
access (WARSI) and advisory extension workers; subsidized inputs; 
facilitation, the setting up of Cooperatives of Small-Scale Industries 
(KOPINKRA) in clusters; the development of infrastructure, building 
special small-scale industrial estates (LIK), partnership programmes (the 
'Foster Parent' scheme), and small business consultancy clinics (KKB); 
the establishment of the Export Support Board of Indonesia (DPE); the 
establishment of common service facilities (UPT) in clusters; and the 
implementation of an incubator system for promoting the development 
of new entrepreneurs. All these have been initiated by the central gov-
ernment and implemented through local government ofﬁces. 
The SMERU Research Institute has mapped out most of the impor-
tant assistance programmes to strengthen MIEs and SEs provided by 
central government and non-government institutes, showing that most 
are run by the central government (SMERU 2004). The data in Table 
3 reveal that there are 64 institutions with such programmes and 594 
identiﬁed programmes, two-thirds of which are provided by the central 
government.10 Other programmes are conducted by NGOs (18%), donor 
agencies (8%), banking institutions (5%), private companies, mainly 
LEs (2%), and other institutions. The government is still running 127 
different support programmes.
Table 3: Number of Institutions and Assistance Programmes to 
Strengthen MIEs and SEs, 1997-2003
Institutions
Number of 
institutions
Number of assistance programmes
Total Still running total %
Government institutuions 13 388 127 32.7
Banking institutions 7 31 25 80.7
Private companies 10 12 12 100.0
Donor agencies 8 46 15 32.6
NGOs 20 109 79 72.5
Others 6 8 8 100.0
Total 64 594 266 44.8
Source: SMERU (2004).
Table 4 shows the type of assistance provided by these programmes. 
The number of activities within each programme also varied, but gener-
ally ranged between one and three. In total, the most common types of 
activities are the provision of training (22.9%), capital assistance/credit 
(17.3%), facilitation (16.1%), and the dissemination/introduction of new 
technology (15.2%).
_______________________________________________________________________ 117
________________________________ Technology Transfer and Diffusion in Indonesia
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t 
in
st
it
u
ti
on
s
B
an
k
in
g 
in
st
it
u
ti
on
s
P
ri
va
te
 
co
m
p
an
ie
s
D
on
or
 
ag
en
ci
es
N
G
O
s
O
th
er
s
T
ot
al
C
ap
it
al
 a
ss
is
ta
n
ce
5.
3
52
.9
25
.0
21
.0
29
.6
28
.6
17
.3
T
ra
in
in
g
21
.1
13
.7
22
.2
19
.0
29
.0
21
.4
22
.9
Fa
ci
li
ta
ta
ti
on
11
.3
9.
8
19
.4
7.
6
28
.7
0.
0
16
.1
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
1.
9
7.
8
2.
8
3.
8
1.
6
21
.4
2.
6
Fa
ci
li
ti
es
16
.2
2.
0
5.
6
8.
6
1.
0
0.
0
9.
7
P
ro
m
ot
io
n
3.
0
3.
9
13
.9
6.
7
1.
0
7.
1
3.
3
D
is
se
m
in
at
io
n
/i
n
tr
od
u
ct
io
n
 
of
 n
ew
 t
ec
h
n
ol
og
y
27
.9
0.
0
0.
0
6.
7
1.
3
0.
0
15
.2
G
u
id
el
in
es
4.
3
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
7
0.
0
2.
4
O
th
er
s
9.
0
9.
8
11
.1
26
.7
7.
2
21
.4
10
.5
So
ur
ce
: s
ee
 T
ab
le
 3
T
ab
le
 4
: P
ro
p
or
ti
on
 o
f 
A
ss
is
ta
n
ce
 P
ro
gr
am
s 
to
 S
tr
en
gt
h
en
 M
IE
s 
an
d
 S
E
s 
B
as
ed
 u
p
on
 t
h
e 
T
yp
e 
of
 A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
an
d
 th
e 
E
xe
cu
ti
n
g 
In
st
it
u
ti
on
s
118 _____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 24•2006
Tulus Tahi Hamonangan Tambunan __________________________________________
The table shows that government agencies most often introduce new 
technology (27.9%) and provide training (21.1%), whereas other institu-
tions mostly provide capital assistance. Of all the executing institutions, 
government agencies play the most prominent role (50.9%), followed by 
NGOs (29.4%) and donor agencies (10.1%). Based on the type of activity, 
training is mostly undertaken by government institutions (46.9%) and 
NGOs (37.2%). Capital assistance is mostly provided by local and inter-
national NGOs (50.3%), followed by government institutions (15.5%) and 
banking institutions (14.9%). Facilitation is mainly provided by NGOs 
(52.4%) and government institutions (35.7%).
Despite their large number, the level of coverage of assistance pro-
grammes is very low. The Integrated Business Survey (SUSI) 2003 from 
BPS shows that out of a total 481,714 units of non-farm MIEs and SEs that 
received government support in 2003, some 203,563 ﬁrms (or 43% of the 
total) received support through one or more of the various government 
programmes. The remainder (57% of the total) received support from 
such agencies as NGOs and foreign foundations. Also, the coverage is 
%11
%17
%8
%2
%7 %1
aretamuS
ilaB & avaJ
araggneT asuN
natnamilaK
isewaluS
aupaP & ukulaM
FIGURE 1: Distribution of Total Non-farm MIEs and SEs Receiv-
ing Support from the Government in Indonesia by Region, 2003 (%
Source: BPS (SUSI 2003).
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heavily skewed towards Java and Bali, i.e. 71% of the total recipient 
non-farm MIEs and SEs are found in Java and Bali (Figure 1). 
This is not only because the majority of these enterprises are located 
in those regions, but it is much easier to conduct a central government-
initiated programme in inner than in outer Indonesia due to better in-
frastructure facilities (e.g. roads and telecommunication links) and the 
availability of supporting agencies such as banks, trading houses and 
business associations. Thus, uneven economic development between 
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FIGURE 2:  Percentage of Non-farm SEs and MIEs Receiving Gov-
ernment Assistance (as a % of Total Non-farm SEs and MIEs in Each 
Region) 2003
inner and outer regions also plays an important role in affecting this 
distribution. Moreover, in Java SMEs are mostly located in clusters close 
to urban areas, while in outer regions they are scattered individually 
far from cities, which makes it more difﬁcult for local government staff 
to recruit potential participants in a programme.  
 However, as a percentage of  total non-farm MIEs and SEs in the re-
gion, Nusa Tenggara (both West and East) scores the highest, while Java 
(including Bali) ranks third (Figure 2). This variation depends on many 
factors, including the willingness of owners/entrepreneurs to attend a 
government-sponsored programme, the availability of alternative pro-
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grammes from non-government institutes, and the proactivity of local 
government staff to encourage local entrepreneurs to participate.
Despite this low level of coverage, those enterprises that do receive 
assistance appear to beneﬁt from it. To assess the effectiveness of assist-
ance programmes, SMERU (2004) studied 172 MIEs and SEs in six Ka-
bupaten/Kota in Java. These ﬁrms are mostly informal, non-legal entities 
whose turnover and employees ﬂuctuate over time, and which operate 
with minimal or no technology. A large number of MIEs (58.6%) and SEs 
(63%) stated that the assistance they had received had increased their 
revenues. Some MIE owners stated that, as a result, they had been able 
to develop their businesses further. Unfortunately, it is not established 
whether there was an increase in knowledge or technological capability 
as a result of the training or technical assistance received. 
Typically, government programmes are evaluated according to the 
number of enterprises that participate. The actual outcomes of the pro-
gramme are generally not assessed. Thus, it is impossible to ascertain 
for most government programmes whether they have proved effective 
in improving technical ability. Moreover, programme beneﬁts need to 
be compared with programme costs to determine the net beneﬁts, but 
this is generally not done (van Diermen, 2004).
A few studies suggest that most SME development programmes 
have not been very successful.11 For instance, the Foster Parent (FP) 
programme attempts to create productive linkages between large and 
small ﬁrms, but levels of participation are low and very little training 
and technical assistance are supplied.12 Furthermore, the emphasis is on 
the provision of capital and marketing assistance. SUSI data 2003 (BPS) 
show that only 11 percent of MIEs and 3 percent of SEs in Indonesia have 
received training and technical assistance from this programme. The 
general impression is that the FP is essentially a non-market mechanism 
to pressure LEs and SMEs into a 'forced marriage'. International evidence 
shows that patterns of business linkages or partnerships between ﬁrms 
are not established through mandatory requirements; rather, they are 
established when they offer commercial beneﬁts to both parties.
Low participation is a common feature of such programmes. For 
example, SUSI data (BPS) show that the majority of MIEs and SEs in 
Indonesia are not members of KOPINKRA. The reason for this is men-
tioned by Klapwijk (1997: 65), who states that: 
In view of the wide deﬁnition of small industry employed by the Ministry, 
much of the promotion efforts may have bypassed the smallest enterprises 
that are most in need of assistance . . .The extension ofﬁcers generally have 
_______________________________________________________________________ 121
________________________________ Technology Transfer and Diffusion in Indonesia
little technical or business experience, and training or other technical facilities 
have been largely provided according to the directions of central planners, 
rather than having been adapted to local needs. 
Another more comprehensive technical assistance programme has 
involved the development of technical service units (UPT)) in existing 
SME clusters of similar industries across provinces. These units provide 
extension and technical services and training courses, and are staffed by 
government technical ofﬁcers who have received special training. Van 
Diermen (2004: 51) concludes that the UPT extension service programme 
has achieved poor results. It has failed to deliver efﬁcient services, to 
target appropriate recipients, or to address the important criteria of 
providing a net beneﬁt to society and/or effectively addressing equity 
or fairness objectives. In particular, van Diermen notes the following:
1. Types of services are highly supply oriented rather than demand 
driven. 
2. Most of the machines and equipments are outdated. Originally, 
these units were supplied with modern technological machines and 
equipments. However, over the years, especially after the economic 
crisis of 1997/98, budgetary constraints prevented the replacement 
of the existing equipment. 
3. Services were delivered indiscriminately to clusters. 
4. The staff of the UPT did not receive the appropriate training to 
respond to entrepreneurs' needs. 
5. There is not enough ﬂexibility in the system to respond to the chang-
ing needs of SMEs, possibly due to the bureaucratic structure of the 
UPT.
Based on his analysis of the effects of macro- and micro-policy envi-
ronments on rural industries in Indonesia, van Diermen (2004) comes 
to the following conclusions: (i) few of the micro-policies (programs) 
implemented by the government have had a lasting impact on improv-
ing rural SMEs; (ii) a signiﬁcant number of macro- and micro-policies 
placed additional costs and burdens on rural SMEs' compliance, which 
has led to most operating outside of the formal economy; and (iii) macro-
policies that created a favourable economic environment (as reﬂected 
by consistently high GDP growth rates and not biased in favour of LEs) 
provided the best stimulus for SME growth.
Based on their study on a furniture cluster in Jepara (Central Java), 
Sandee et al. (2000) conclude that public intervention is likely to have 
contributed to the success of this cluster. A comprehensive development 
package – including technical upgrading through the provision of a 
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common service facility for wood drying; export training and support 
for participation in trade fairs; and investment in improvement of the 
regional infrastructure (container facilities, roads, telephone) – helped 
the cluster to gradually develop export markets. 
On the other hand, Sato's (2000) ﬁeld study of several clusters in 
the metalworking and machinery industry in Java concludes that the 
successful development of these clusters has been achieved without 
signiﬁcant government support. Her ﬁndings on the effectiveness of 
government programmes for the development of SMEs is also supported 
by Tambunan's (1998) ﬁndings on rattan industries in Padang (West 
Sumatra). They both conclude that the government's efforts to support 
the clusters have not yielded positive results. One reason appears to be 
the lack of coordination between the various government agencies. In 
many clusters, local government agencies such as regional ofﬁces of the 
State Ministry for Cooperatives and SMEs, the Ministry of Industry, state 
universities and skills training centers for workers (Balai Latihan Kerja) 
from the Department of Manpower provide some support. However, 
sometimes different agencies provide similar schemes/programmes, 
and there is little attempt to coordinate their efforts.
While the government is the largest supplier of training programmes 
(see Table 4), the evidence suggests that the quality and relevance of 
the training provided have been poor. Most of these programmes do 
not appear to have been very effective in upgrading the technological 
capabilities of the ﬁrms trained. For example, Sandee (1994: 152) notes 
that training materials and other information do not always match the 
needs of the producers: 
In practice, direct assistance frequently concerns brief training sessions of one 
or two days for a selected group of producers. Such sessions are characterized 
by a great deal of theory and little attention is paid to how to improve the 
actual running of the business of particular activities. 
 Universities and research institutes can also contribute to the diffu-
sion of knowledge to domestic ﬁrms, particularly manufacturing ﬁrms, 
through publications, patents and consultancy services (Agrawal 2001). 
In Indonesia, the public science and technology institutes consist of the 
12 national-level and several regional-level R&D centres of the Agency 
for Industrial Research and Development (BPPI), the Department of 
Industry, and the research centres of the non-departmental government 
research institutes, particularly the Indonesian Institutes of Sciences 
(LIPI) and the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology 
(BPPT). However, BPPI's R&D centres are mostly engaged in product 
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certiﬁcation, training and testing activities for manufacturing ﬁrms, 
particularly state-owned companies and private SMEs. Their research 
staffs are generally not well trained and are often unaware of the latest 
technological developments in their ﬁelds. Moreover, much of their 
laboratory equipment is obsolete because the centres are underfunded, 
particularly since the economic crisis of 1997/98 (Lall and Rao 1995). 
Hence, in general they are not able to provide adequate technical in-
formation or technology support services to Indonesia's manufacturing 
ﬁrms (Thee 1998).
The non-departmental government institutes, particularly LIPI and 
BPPT, are better funded, better equipped and better staffed, with highly 
trained researchers, many of whom have pursued postgraduate training 
abroad. However, like the Department of Industry's R&D institutes, the 
research centres of LIPI and BPPT have not played a signiﬁcant role in 
developing the technological capabilities of Indonesia's non-farm ﬁrms, 
particularly in manufacturing industry. The reason for this is that they 
have generally not been able to establish mutually proﬁtable linkages 
with national industry, particularly private industry. Because of their 
lack of contact with national industries, they are generally not aware 
of the technological needs of private industry and therefore lag behind 
world technological frontiers (Lall and Rao 1995). As a result of their 
failure to establish mutually proﬁtable linkages with non-farm ﬁrms, 
most, if not all, of their research is supply rather than demand driven 
(Thee 1998).
Moreover, the universities and R&D institutes are located mainly in 
urban areas, having little interest in the problems of rural ﬁrms. The 
available literature conﬁrms that spillovers from universities or R&D 
institutes to ﬁrms are positively correlated with geographical proximity 
(see e.g. Anselin et al. 1997).
The government-initiated programmes discussed above were initi-
ated and sponsored by the central government in the pre-economic 
decentralization and regional autonomy era prior to 2001. Nowadays, 
many central governmental economic developmental initiatives have 
been transferred to the provinces and, in particular, to the regencies 
within the provinces. This also includes development programmes for 
SMEs, in which local governments must themselves initiate and ﬁnance 
programmes to support SMEs in their own regions. Unfortunately, 
no studies have been conducted to date to examine the effect of these 
economic and power transitions from central to regional government 
on SME development programmes. However, a number of ofﬁcial re-
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ports from the State Ministry for Cooperativse and SMEs reveals that 
some central government programmes have ceased to operate, while 
local governments have been slow to launch new programmes. Lack 
of funding is often cited as the main reason, although lack of initiative 
may well be the primary cause as local governments are accustomed 
to receiving orders from the central government (a typical 'top-down' 
development approach during the pre-economic decentralization and 
regional autonomy era).
Evidence of Knowledge Diffusion in the Tegal 
Metalworking Industry
Tegal district is located near the north coast of Central Java on key truck-
ing and rail routes. Major industries in the area include food process-
ing, textiles and furniture. The district generates 22.09 percent of its 
annual income from the industrial sector, compared to 24.24 percent 
from trade and 24.62 percent from the agriculture sector. These three 
sectors are the largest contributors to the district economy (Bappeda, 
2005, and BPS, 2005).
Tegal district is one of the few areas in Indonesia to have a metalwork-
ing cluster. The Tegal metalworking industry employs about 30,029 work-
ers out of a total of 118,820 (around 25 percent) workers constituting the 
district's industrial sector. There are around 2,811 metal workshops in 
the district. Among these there are seven sentra, or groups of geographic 
agglomerations of metal enterprises producing the same metal products, 
such as components or spare parts for ships and vehicles. Since the New 
Order era, sentra have become the focus of government development 
strategies for SMEs in all manufacturing subsectors, including the met-
alworking industry in Tegal district. The majority of metal workshops 
are small, employing less than 20 workers, mostly male. 
Most of Tegal's metal workshops rely on the same basic metalwork-
ing technologies, e.g. casting, cutting, bending, drilling or stamping 
(depending on product), machining, welding, ﬁnishing (painting or 
electronic plating depending on product), and assembly. Their com-
parative advantage has been in fulﬁlling small orders for simple metal 
products or components. The small size of the workshops gives them 
greater ﬂexibility and Tegal's abundant cheap labor can outweigh the 
productivity advantages of more capital-intensive production. There is 
often intense price competition among workshops.
Tegal district has been a metalworking centre since the mid-1800s 
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when it was the locus of several sugar-processing factories and related 
enterprises, including locomotive repair shops and metal processing 
factories. The industry continued, thriving particularly under the New 
Order's massive infrastructure and development agenda. At the begin-
ning of the 1980s, the ﬁrst subcontracting activity started in the district, 
sparking government activity to develop the metalworking industry. 
Types of Workshops
The structure of the Tegal metalwork value chain is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. According to the size of production and the level of production 
sophistication, there are two types of workshops in the Tegal metal-
working industry: (i) MEs and LEs called inti and (ii) SEs and MIEs 
called plasma. Inti workshops receive orders for metal components from 
large private companies (LEs) outside the district. Large inti workshops 
employing a total of up to 100 men derive a majority of their income 
from subcontracting work. During the survey in 2005, there were sev-
eral large private companies that subcontracted work to Tegal metal 
workshops, including PT Komatsu Indonesia Tbk, PT Daihatsu, and 
some divisions of the Astra Group such as PT Sanwa and PT Katshusiro. 
These companies often source metal components from several parts of 
the country, mostly in West Java. Among these companies, the most 
prominent is PT Komatsu Indonesia Tbk, which is a subsidiary of a 
Japanese company that established subcontracting production linkages 
with Tegal metal workshops in 1998. This company produces various 
types of equipment for construction and mining activities under the 
global trademark of Komatsu, such as hydraulic excavators, bulldozers, 
motor graders, frames and related components, cast steel products as 
well as dump tracks.
Plasma workshops usually hire cheap, unskilled labour or use fam-
ily members as unpaid workers (helpers). The owner normally passes 
basic metalworking skills on to his employees, leaving the technical 
capacity of the workshop highly dependent on the technical capacity 
of the owner. Inti workshops often subcontract part of their production 
to plasma workshops. 
Inti and plasma workshops that have no subcontracting businesses 
with inti workshops manufacture entirely for the wholesalers and retail-
ers or sell their products directly to local consumers rather than through 
these marketing channels. Many wholesalers and retailers purchase 
goods from Tegal metal workshops for resale in urban stores.
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Methodology
This case study is based on two weeks of ﬁeldwork in Tegal district. 
In-depth interviews were carried out with 34 respondents: one repre-
sentative of PT Komatsu, ﬁve inti workshops (including three of the four 
inti workshops directly meeting subcontracting orders for PT Komatsu), 
three plasma, nine owners of retail manufacturing metalworking ﬁrms, 
two retailers, four NGOs and ten government representatives. These 
respondents were selected from four subdistrits, i.e. Adiwerna, Talang, 
Desa Kebasen and Desa Dampyak. The research sampling focused on 
clustered metal workshops in the automotive and shipbuilding in-
dustries.13 During the ﬁeldwork, two focus group discussions (FGDs) 
were held in Desa Kebasen, in which the workshop owners themselves 
participated. Discussions focused on the needs of their businesses, and 
assessment of government and private sector training that they had 
received over the last ﬁve years. 
Findings
The Major Knowledge Providers
Tegal District's main external knowledge providers are LEs, just as PT 
Komatsu provide to their subcontractors (i.e. inti workshops), and to a 
lesser extent local government. Some domestic retail market suppliers 
also act as knowledge providers by informing metal workshops about 
consumer preferences, market demand and new innovations.
To access knowledge from LEs, however, a workshop must have at-
FIGURE 3: Structure of the Tegal Metalwork Value Chain
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tained a certain level of technical and managerial expertise. Larger metal 
workshops are more likely to adopt new technologies in their bid to 
become subcontracting inti to LEs. By building upon existing technical 
and managerial capacity, larger workshops are able to enter a virtuous 
circle where quality output leads to subcontracts which lead to private 
training provided by LEs.
Training provided by LEs has proved to be the most successful 
method of efﬁciently transferring knowledge to selected inti workshops. 
While government-led initiatives attempt to cover a broader range of 
workshops covering more topics, this has not resulted in the efﬁcient 
transfer of high-quality, usable knowledge. Though a good reputation 
and personal connections are important, LEs require proof that a 
workshop has the capacity to produce high-quality components. An 
audit is held to determine whether the workshop has the required 
machinery, manpower, facilities, legal standing and competency 
in ISO standards. The potential subcontractor is then requested to 
produce a sample component by providing technical drawings. Before 
an agreement is signed, LEs will often ask for a trial run of the mass 
production process, subjecting the output to quality control tests.
After winning a contract, an inti subcontractor has access to a 
signiﬁcant level of technical training. According to a subcontractor 
of PT Komatsu, training is directly addressed to the technical needs 
of the workshop to meet the production requirements of Komatsu. 
Indonesian experts from the Jakarta Komatsu ofﬁce who were heading 
up the training sessions clearly delivered the necessary knowledge 
and emphasized practical applications, with 90 percent of the training 
time spent in hands-on experience. Trainers also help the workshop to 
identify and troubleshoot potential problems.
This style of knowledge diffusion has two important limitations. 
First, it focuses training only on larger inti workshops, with smaller 
subcontracting ﬁrms (plasma) beneﬁting only indirectly or, in the case of 
small retail market ﬁrms, deriving no beneﬁt at all. Second, LE training 
does not seek to develop the inti workshops' capability to outperform 
their capacity as low-cost production centres for selected components. 
Moreover, LEs do help inti workshops to build capacity to manufacture 
component parts, but there has been little interest in upgrading from 
specialized parts manufacture to manufacture and assemblage of 
ﬁnished products.
Most plasma workshops lack the technical ability to produce compli-
cated components with the precision required by LEs, thus making it 
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unlikely that they will receive subcontracting orders. Plasma workshops 
often use second-hand or homemade equipment. They hire low-skilled, 
low-wage workers with little or no experience and rely on the shop-own-
er's technical knowledge. Since many plasma owners built their expertise 
through working in small shops and rarely have a formal academic train-
ing, they have difﬁculty reading technical drawings and instead rely on 
copying samples, leading to less accurate output. Most plasma workshops 
sell to the retail market or to domestic market suppliers a limited range 
of simple ﬁnal products, e.g. pulleys, ship windows. While these retailers 
may demand a sample product, there is much less emphasis on preci-
sion. Generally, retailers emphasize low cost over quality. Moreover, 
strong competition among retail suppliers inhibits knowledge transfer 
and encourages production of low-quality, inexpensive products. For 
knowledge improvement, these plasma workshops depend largely on 
untargeted, irregularly publicized government programmes, which 
may not best suit their needs.
Cheap labour and relatively small, erratic job orders reduce the incen-
tive for workshops to specialize or acquire expensive machinery to in-
crease productivity. As one seasoned metalworker explained, the strength 
of the plasma workshop is the ﬂexibility to do smaller orders. However, this 
ﬂexibility becomes a liability to capacity development when workshops 
have to meet many small orders and never develop specialization.
Though less direct, the subcontracting system does provide some 
market opportunities for smaller workshops to beneﬁt from the virtuous 
circle affecting inti capacity building. Subcontracting plasma increases 
the incentive to produce higher quality for a higher price, with technical 
coaching from inti clients in their own virtuous circle. Inti respondents 
for auto components, for instance, turn to plasma workshops to produce 
10–15 percent of their orders from LEs, usually subcomponents of 
components or basic parts made more cheaply in small workshops, while 
still passing the quality control requirements of LEs. Often soft loans are 
provided to plasma to help them acquire new machines capable of higher 
quality output. Inti and plasma involved in subcontracting are more 
likely to use the UPTD Lab, especially to test the quality of materials. 
They are better able to offset lab usage costs through the higher price 
paid by LEs for quality parts.
Learning takes place through quality control as inti often build a 
procedure for troubleshooting mistakes into their subcontracting rela-
tionships. Inti workshops engage in coaching plasma on quality control 
standards and in some cases support former employees already familiar 
with these standards in starting up plasma.14 
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Knowledge Diffusion among Small Workshops
It was stated above that a cluster of producers can be a powerful means 
for knowledge diffusion. However, in this Tegal case knowledge 
transfer between small workshops is often contingent on personal 
networks and is conditioned by competition. On occasion, among 
workshops producing for the retail market, competition can sometimes 
become 'unhealthy' which has an opposite effect, inhibiting knowledge 
diffusion among them. For example, when a competing ﬁrm bought off 
a shopowner's driver after a marketing trip and followed up with lower 
bids to the same potential clients. Many workshop owners were worried 
about ﬁrms' tactics to reduce production costs, often at the expense of 
quality. Some workshops ﬁnd the right combination of cheap scrap 
metals to get their products to pass buyers' inspection standards, but 
these lower-quality items wear out more quickly and this does little to 
strengthen the reputation of the Tegal metalworking industry as a whole. 
This cost-cutting in turn creates price pressures, forcing competing 
workshops to a race for the bottom in terms of quality.
Small workshop respondents mentioned that there was hesitancy 
among metalworkers to share new and possibly advantageous techni-
cal knowledge. Technical knowledge tends to be shared only amongst 
personal friends whose shops are not in direct competition. The same 
hesitancy was evident in giving too much training to employees. Ex-
employees were likely to start up competing businesses, as was the case 
with one workshop owner interviewed, who lost 40 percent of his retail 
market share to ex-employees who began producing ship windows out 
of lower-grade materials.
Marketing information is even more closely guarded. In addition to 
the tactics mentioned above, sometimes domestic market suppliers will 
come to the cluster (sentra) and play the workshops off one against the 
other, using their proximity and lack of specialization to engage them in 
competitive price-cutting. The owner of KPY, one of the district's most 
successful metal workshops in both subcontracting and retail produc-
tion, explained that lack of trust and mutual suspicion among metal-
workers was the main constraint to metal works development and was 
the prime reason for the lack of growth in metalworkers' associations.
The Role of Government
While the district government has demonstrated a keen awareness of 
the importance of enhanced knowledge and skills to improve the com-
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petitiveness of local metalworking shops, it has not been very successful 
at systematically improving the skills of local ﬁrms. It has attempted to 
both facilitate direct training as well as build up supporting institutions 
that can assist ﬁrms, and to lower information costs among ﬁrms. These 
efforts, while signiﬁcant and well intentioned, have been handicapped 
by poor targeting, a lack of sufﬁcient funds, an inadequate number of 
skilled staff dedicated to the effort, and weak feedback mechanisms 
between government and metalworking shops.
The government is the only source of managerial training for plasma 
and retail market workshops as well as many inti that receive only lim-
ited management training from LEs clients. Since 2001, the majority of 
government training has focused on technical subjects or technical qual-
ity management processes. For some smaller workshops without direct 
links to LEs, local government-facilitated technical training remains the 
only source of technical information outside the past experience of the 
workshop owner. However, according to respondents who participated 
in government training, these activities were poorly targeted, often in-
commensurate with their level of skills or the machinery available; while 
on occasion the training focused on skills they had already mastered. 
The district government has currently linked up with outside insti-
tutions, including strong partnerships with the Central Government's 
Indonesian Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology 
(BPPT) and with an NGO, Yayasan Dana Bakti Astra (YDBA). Although 
this strategy has succeeded in bringing new knowledge to the cluster, 
what is offered in the way of training is often ill-suited to the needs of 
participants. In 1997, the district government opened the UPT to enhance 
subcontracting workshops' capacity to produce high-quality, precision 
goods. The ﬁrst government-funded UPT opened in 1982, enabling the 
metalworking cluster to access the machines necessary to meet their 
orders. The UPT was not able to keep up with technical advances and 
soon several of the workshops bought more advanced machinery for 
their own internal requirements.
Concluding Remarks
This case study demonstrates three crucial facts. First, despite some 
limitations, MNCs such as PT Komatsu Indonesia are very important 
as a source of technology transfer to local SMEs. PT Komatsu is 
able to increase the technology and hence production capability of 
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its inti subcontractors, and indirectly, plasma workshops that have 
subcontracting links with the inti. This is also supported by Blomstrőm 
and Sjöholm's (1999) analysis of statistical data, showing that industries 
with a large presence of MNCs are able to increase the production ca-
pabilities of local companies. However, MIEs in particular are largely 
excluded from the direct transfer of technology, as MNCs are more likely 
to subcontract parts of their production to local ﬁrms that already enjoy 
a certain level of technological capability, and these are mostly MEs and 
to a lower extent, SEs. This supports the general view in the literature 
that the more absorptive capacity the local ﬁrms have, the more beneﬁt 
the local ﬁrms will gain from a transfer of technology.
The second conclusion to be drawn is that although local SMEs' tech-
nical capabilities in the cluster are generally low, many of them (mostly 
SEs and MEs) have innovation capability, in that they demonstrated an 
ability to advance from making relatively simple products to supply-
ing metal components with higher grades of precision on a consistent 
basis. At least, this was demonstrated by the PT Komatsu Indonesia's 
inti suppliers. 
Third, though well-intentioned, the government's role has produced 
poor measurable results due to (i) inappropriate training materials that 
fail to meet the needs of producers, (ii) budgetary constraints for man-
aging and maintenance of the UPT, and (iii) a lack of qualiﬁed trainers. 
The local government's training and technical assistance can though 
claim a limited positive impact, in the sense that it provides assistance 
to ﬁrms that would otherwise receive no assistance at all from other 
bodies such as LEs or university. 
So, the ﬁndings may suggest that currently, within SMEs, MEs 
will derive more beneﬁts from the presence of FDI than their smaller 
counterparts, as they are better able to meet requirements to become 
subcontractors. To achieve an optimal spillover effect, this depends on 
cooperation between MEs as the ﬁrst technology recipients and SEs and 
MIEs. This is also the role that government should play in supporting 
technology capacity building in SEs and MIEs. Failing this, the spillover 
effect will not materialize or the technology transfer will be limited to 
MEs; hence the presence of FDI will result in an increased technology 
gap between MEs, on the one hand, and SEs and MIEs, on the other 
hand. A key lesson from this case study is to understand how SMEs, 
especially SEs and MIEs, can best obtain and utilize appropriate technol-
ogy and how government can promote the most effective technology 
development pathways. 
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NOTES
1  It is extremely difﬁcult to measure and compare levels of technological capacity 
of enterprises or industries directly. Therefore, the measurement of total factor 
productivity (TFP) or partial productivity for one factor is often used as a proxy for 
measuring this capacity. One means of establishing levels of technological capacity 
is achieved by comparing levels of labour productivity.
2  See also previous studies on productivity in Indonesia (particularly in manufac-
turing) from Shepherd et al. (1998), Hill (2001), Ito (2004), Takii (2004, 2005), Tim-
mer (1999), Rice and Abdullah (2000), Berry et al. (2001) and Takii and Ramstetter 
(2004). 
3  See Thee (1990a, 1990b, 1991), Hill (1988), Thee and Pangestu (1994) and Sato 
(1998).
4  See for example Hobday (1994), Mans (1996) and World Bank (1996).
5  There is a growing literature on spillover effects from the transfer of technology; 
see for example, Kokko et al. (1998).
6  For example, diffusion can occur through magazines and newspapers, education 
programmes and documentaries on television, seminars, workshops, training, 
plant visits and exhibitions. It can also occur if an Indonesian manager or senior 
technician employed in a foreign ﬁrm leaves this ﬁrm to work in a domestic ﬁrm. 
The knowledge or experience received while working for the foreign ﬁrm is then 
deployed in the new job within the local context.  
7  See for example Harianto (1993), Kitabata (1988), Sato (2000), Supratikno (2001) and 
JICA (2000).
8  SAs can take many forms, including subcontracting, joint ventures and cooperation 
in marketing, promotion or R&D activities.
9   See for example Sandee (1995) and Sandee and ter Wingel (2002).
10  The scale of each assistance programme varied greatly, based on the amount of 
funds, time frame and geographical scope. 
11  For discussion explicitly or implicitly on the government programmes to support 
SMEs in Indonesia, see for instance Klapwijk (1997), Sandee (1994, 1995), Sandee et 
al. (1994, 2000, 2002), van Dierman (1997, 2004) and Sato (2000). 
12  In this scheme, introduced on a nationwide basis in February 1992, all state-owned 
enterprises and big private companies (LEs) are required to assist SMEs with capital, 
training and technical assistance, marketing, procurement of raw materials, inter alia. 
For example, with respect to marketing, the parent companies provide promotion 
facilities such as trade exhibitions and study tours for the supported enterprises 
or act as a trading house. With respect to technology, the parent companies give 
ﬁnancial assistance for the purchase of new machines or provide them with technical 
training or technicians during the innovation process.
13  These two industries were selected by the local government for intensive assistance 
based on existing competency. According to Mr. Dasuki, Head of the Industrial Af-
fairs Sub-Agency, the industries showing the greatest competency are those seen 
as having access to key markets, those with many (including small) workshops 
involved in production, and having developed quality management systems.  
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14  A plasma subcontractor for KPY, one of PT Komatsu's inti, explained that his com-
pany received useful technical coaching as part of a quality control process conducted 
upon delivery of his product to KPY.20 In a case of knowledge spillover, his ﬁrm 
applied some of these technical lessons not only to his subcontracting operations, 
but also to the production of retail market goods.
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